We address the problem in which a client stores a large amount of data with an untrusted server in such a way that, at any moment, the client can ask the server to compute a function on some portion of its outsourced data. In this scenario, the client must be able to efficiently verify the correctness of the result despite no longer knowing the inputs of the delegated computation, it must be able to keep adding elements to its remote storage, and it does not have to fix in advance (i.e., at data outsourcing time) the functions that it will delegate. Even more ambitiously, clients should be able to verify in time independent of the input-size -a very appealing property for computations over huge amounts of data.
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management. Consider for example the following scenario.
A client has a collection of a large (potentially unbounded) amount of data D = D1, D2, D3, . . ., for instance, environmental data such as air pollution levels at fixed time intervals (e.g., every hour), and it may wish to compute statistics on such data. If the client's memory is not large enough to store the entire data, the client might consider relying on a cloud service and storing the data on a remote server S. Other significant examples of this scenario include arbitrary files at remote storage systems, as well as endless data streams such as financial data (e.g., price fixing data from the stock markets, financial figures and revenues of companies), experimental data (e.g., genetic data, laboratory measurements), and further environmental data (e.g., surface weather observations). In this scenario, we hence have a client who incrementally sends D to a server S, the server stores D, and at certain points in time the client asks S to compute a function on (a portion of) the currently outsourced data. We stress that the data D and its size cannot be fixed in advance as the client may need to add additional data to the outsourced storage. Analogously, the client might not know in advance what functions it will apply on the outsourced data (e.g., it may wish to compute several statistics).
However, if the server is untrusted (i.e., it is malicious or becomes prey to an external attack), how can the client verify that the results provided by the server are correct? This question naturally leads to two important requirements: (1) security, meaning that the server should be able to "prove" the correctness of the delegated computation for some function f ; and (2) efficiency, meaning that the client should be able to check the proof by requiring significantly fewer resources than those that are needed to compute f (including both computation and communication). Furthermore, if we consider computations over very large sets of inputs (e.g., statistics on huge data sets), we want to be more ambitious and envision the achievement of (3) input-independent efficiency, meaning that verifying the correctness of a computation f (D1, . . . , Dn) requires time independent of n. Moreover, two further requirements are crucial in this setting: (4) unbounded storage, meaning that the size of the outsourced data should not be fixed a-priori, i.e., clients should be able to outsource any (possibly growing) amount of data; and (5) function-independence, meaning that a client should be able to outsource its data without having to know in advance the functions that it will delegate later.
Relation with Verifiable Computation. The problem of securely and efficiently outsourcing the computation of a function f to a remote server has been the subject of many works in the so-called field of verifiable computation. Most of these works achieve the goals of security (1) and efficiency (2) , but they inevitably fail in achieving requirements (3)- (5) . Roughly speaking, the issue is that most existing work requires the client to know (i.e., to store a local copy of) the input D for the verification of the delegated function (e.g., in SNARG-based approaches [10, 25] and in signatures of correct computation [40] ), or, otherwise, to send D to the server all at once (rather than sending it over time) and to keep a small local state which would not allow to append additional data at a later time (e.g., in [44, 22] ). Perhaps more critically, many of the existing solutions in this area require the delegator to run in time proportional to the input size n of the delegated function, e.g., in time poly(n). In the various existing protocols, these limitations arise for different reasons (see Section 1.1 for a more detailed discussion). However, even if verification in these works is more efficient than running f , we think that, for computations over huge data sets, a poly(n) overhead is still unacceptably high.
The only approach that comes close to achieving requirements (1)- (5) is the work by Chung et al. on memory delegation [20] . The authors propose a scheme based on techniques from [29] which exploit the power of the PCP theorem [6] . With this scheme, a client can delegate a broad class of computations over its outsourced memory fulfilling the requirements from above (except for verification efficiency, which requires time log n, instead of constant time). While providing a satisfying solution in theory, this approach suffers from the usual impracticality issues of general-purpose PCP techniques and hence does not lead to truly practical solutions to the problem.
Our Contribution. In this work, we address the problem of verifiable delegation of computations on (growing) outsourced data. Our main contribution is the first practical protocol that achieves all five of the requirements stated before. Namely, a client can (continuously) store a large amount of data D = D1, D2, D3 . . . with the server, and then, at certain points in time, it can request the computation of a function f on (a portion of) the outsourced data, e.g., v = f (Di 1 , . . . , Di n ). Using our protocol, the server sends to the client a short piece of information vouching for the correctness of v. The protocol achieves inputindependent efficiency in the amortized model: after a single precomputation with cost |f |, the client can verify every subsequent evaluation of f in constant time, i.e., regardless of the input size n. Moreover, fulfilling properties (4)-(5), we have that data outsourcing and function delegation are completely decoupled, i.e., the client can continuously add elements to the remote storage, and the delegated functions do not have to be fixed a priori. This means that the cost of outsourcing the data can be, in fact, excluded from the delegation; think for instance of incrementally outsourcing a large data stream during an entire year, and then computing statistics on the data at the end of the year.
Our solution works for computations over integers in the ring Zp (where p is a large prime of roughly 2λ bits, for a security parameter λ), and supports the evaluation of arithmetic circuits of degree up to 2. This restricted class of computations is enough to capture a wide range of significant arithmetic computations, such as meaningful statistics, including counting, summation, (weighted) average, arithmetic mean, standard deviation, variance, covariance, weighted variance with constant weights, quadratic mean (aka rootmean square -RMS), mean squared error (MSE), the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, the coefficient of determination (R 2 ), and the least squares fit of a data set {(xi, vi)} n i=1 (in the case when the xi are universal constants, e.g., days of the year)
1 . Our key technical contribution is the introduction of homomorphic MACs with efficient verification. This cryptographic primitive extends homomorphic message authenticators [27] by adding a crucial efficiency property for the verification algorithm. We propose a first realization of homomorphic MACs with efficient verification (see Section 1.2 for an overview of our techniques), and we prove its security under the Decision Linear assumption [11] . Using the above construction we build an efficient protocol that can be implemented using bilinear pairings.
To demonstrate the practicality of our solution, we evaluate the concrete operations that have to be performed by the client and the server, as well as the bandwidth overhead introduced by the protocol for transferring the proofs. If we consider 80 bits of security and an implementation of symmetric pairings [35] on a standard desktop machine, we observe the following costs (see Table 2 for the 128-bit case): For outsourcing a data item Di, the client needs to perform a single modular exponentiation in 0.24ms. This operation yields a very short authentication tag of size 0.08kB, which is sent to the server along with Di. For the verification of a computation result v, the client receives a proof σv of size 0.21kB from the server, and can check this proof by computing one pairing and one multi-exponentiation in 1.06ms.
As we mentioned before, we achieve input-independent efficiency in an amortized sense. So, the above verification costs are obtained after the precomputation of some concise information ω f related to the delegated function f . Precomputing ω f takes the same time as computing f (with almost no additional overhead!), it does not require knowledge of the input data, and ω f can be re-used an unbounded number of times to verify several evaluations of f on many different outsourced data sets. To generate the proof σv related to the evaluation of a function f , the server has to run f with an additional, yet constant, overhead -derived from replacing additions in f with a group operation, and replacing multiplications with a pairing. Although our solution can still not capture general-purpose computations, the above performance evaluation shows that for our case of interest we achieve results that are encouraging for a practical deployment of this protocol.
Related Work
Memory Delegation. The work of Chung et al. [20] on memory delegation and streaming delegation is the closest one to the model considered in our work. In memory delegation the client uploads his memory to the server (in an offline phase), and it can later ask the server to update the outsourced memory and to compute a function f on its entire memory (in an online phase). In streaming delegation the memory can be updated only by appending elements. The main advantages of the work of Chung et al. over our results are that: (i) the client can change values in the outsourced memory, (ii) they provide solutions for more expressive computations (i.e., a 4-round protocol for arbitrary poly-time programs). However, their solutions also suffer some disad-vantages. First, they require the client to be stateful (in our solution the client keeps only a fixed secret key). Second, in streaming delegation, the size N of the stream has to be apriori bounded. Such a bound also affects the client's memory since it requires a local storage size of approximately log N at the client, meaning that N cannot be chosen arbitrarily long, and thus the stream cannot be endless. Also, in their solutions, the client still runs in time polylog(n) in the online phase, where n is the size of the entire memory.
Authenticated Data Structures. A line of research which addresses a problem closely related to the one considered in this paper is the existing work on authenticated data structures [39, 50] . This area considers a setting in which clients want to securely delegate certain operations on data structures that are stored at untrusted remote servers. Existing work addresses both static settings and dynamic settings (where data structures can be updated), and it mostly focuses on specific data structure operations, such as range search queries over databases [31, 36] , authenticated dictionaries [21, 41, 30] , and set operations over a dynamic collection of sets [42] . However, none of the works in this area considers the secure outsourcing of arbitrary or arithmetic computations (e.g., statistics) over remotely stored data.
Multi-Function Verifiable Computation. The notion of multi-function verifiable computation proposed by Parno, Raykova, and Vaikuntanathan [44] is close to our model, in that a client can delegate the computation of many functions f1, f2, . . . on the same input D, while being able to efficiently verify the results. Even though multi-function verifiable computation does not require the client to fix the function f before outsourcing the data, this model still falls short of our requirements. The main problem is that in multi-function verifiable computation, the client has to store some information τD for every input D on which it will ask to compute a function fi(D). Furthermore, there is no possibility of updating τD without locally storing the previous data. This essentially means that the data D has to be sent all at once, thus ruling out all applications in the growing data scenario.
Homomorphic Signatures and MACs. The problem of realizing homomorphic message authentication schemes in both the symmetric setting (MACs) and in the asymmetric setting (signatures) has been considered by many prior works. Homomorphic signatures were first proposed by Johnson et al. [32] . However, since then, most works focus solely on linear functions, mainly because of the important application to network coding [12] . Several efficient schemes for linear functions have been proposed both in the random oracle model [12, 26, 14, 16] and in the standard model [1, 3, 17, 18, 23, 4, 5] . Three more recent works consider the case of larger classes of functions [13, 27, 15] . Boneh and Freeman [13] proposed a realization of homomorphic signatures for bounded constant degree polynomials. Gennaro and Wichs [27] introduced homomorphic MACs and gave a construction for arbitrary computations which is proven secure in a weaker model where the adversary cannot ask verification queries. Catalano and Fiore [15] proposed realizations of homomorphic MACs that, despite capturing a restricted class of computations (i.e., arithmetic circuits with polynomiallybounded degree), support verification queries and are more efficient than previous works.
However, virtually all of the above works suffer the problem of having a verification algorithm which runs in time proportional to the function. Gennaro and Wichs [27] discuss the possibility of verifying a MAC in time better than executing the function, and propose some general solutions for their scheme which are based on fully homomorphic encryption and SNARGs [37] . However, neither the proposed solutions nor the suggested techniques yield schemes that achieve input-independent efficiency, and they do not seem to lead to practically efficient solutions, at least not as practical as required in this work. Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs). A solution for realizing fully homomorphic signatures would be to use succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) [10] . For a given NP statement, this primitive allows for producing a succinct argument for proving knowledge of the corresponding witness. The main advantage of SNARKs is the succinctness of the argument (i.e., its size is independent of the size of both the NP statement and its witness), which can thus be verified efficiently. However, SNARKs are not as practically efficient as we might wish, and require either the random oracle model [37] or non standard, non-falsifiable, assumptions [28] . Verifiable Computation. As we mentioned earlier, the problem considered by our work and addressed via homomorphic authenticators is related to the notion of verifiable computation for which there exits a vast literature, ranging from works for arbitrary computations [33, 37, 29, 24, 19, 2, 44, 25, 43] to works for specific classes of computations [9, 22, 40, 16] . In verifiable computation, a client wants to delegate a computationally heavy task to a remote server while being able to verify the result in a very efficient way. As we mentioned before, most of these works suffer several limitations that do not make them appropriate for the model considered in this paper. For example, many existing solutions require the delegator to run in time proportional to the input size of the delegated function. This limitation arises for different reasons. For instance, in the definition proposed by Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno [24] (and later adopted in several works, e.g., [19, 9, 44, 22] ), to delegate the computation of f (D), the client has to compute an encoding τ D,f of D, which depends on the function f . However, if we want to choose f after outsourcing D, the computation of τ D,f is no longer possible. Alternatively, one could keep the entire input D locally and then compute τ D,f from D and f , which would yield a running time proportional to the input size. In other work (e.g., [33, 37, 29] ) the efficiency requirement for a client is to run in time poly(n, log T ), when delegating a function f that runs in time T and takes inputs of size n.
Furthermore, as observed by Gennaro and Wichs [27] , even if it is possible to reinterpret some of the results on verifiable computation in the setting of homomorphic message authenticators, the resulting solutions are still not appropriate. In particular, they might require a client to send the data all at once and would not allow for composition of several authenticated computations. We refer the reader to [27] for a thorough discussion about this.
Another interesting line of work in this area recently proposed efficient systems for verifiable computation [47, 46, 45, 51] . The proposed solutions also work in a model where the client needs to know the input of the computation, and it also has to engage in an interactive protocol with the server in order to verify the results. In contrast, our work consid-ers a completely non-interactive setting in which the proof is transferred from the server to the client in a single round of communication. In the past there have been proposals of practical solutions, but of limited provable security: e.g., solutions based on audit (e.g., [38, 8] ) or secure co-processors (e.g., [49, 52] ) which prove the computation as correct, under the assumption that the adversary cannot tamper with the processor. Compared to these results, our work relies only on standard cryptographic assumptions, and does not require any trusted hardware.
A High-Level Overview of Our Techniques
To obtain our solution we build on the notion of homomorphic message authenticators proposed by Gennaro and Wichs [27] , a primitive which can be considered the secretkey equivalent of homomorphic signatures [13] . The basic idea of homomorphic MACs is that a user can use a secret key to generate a set of tags σ1, . . . , σn authenticating values D1, . . . , Dn respectively. Then, anyone can homomorphically execute a function f over (σ1, . . . , σn) to generate a short tag σ that authenticates D as the output of f (D1, . . . , Dn). At first glance, homomorphic MACs seem to perfectly fit the problem of verifiable computations on (growing) outsourced data. However, a closer look at this primitive reveals that this idea lacks the very important property of efficient verification. As discussed in Section 1.1, the issue is that in all existing constructions the verification algorithm of homomorphic MACs runs in time proportional to the description of the function. Our key contribution is therefore to solve this efficiency issue by proposing a definition and a first practical realization of homomorphic MACs with efficient verification.
The starting point for the design of our construction is the homomorphic MAC scheme of Catalano and Fiore [15] : to authenticate a value m ∈ Zp, one "encodes" m into a degree-1 polynomial y ∈ Zp[x] such that y(0) = m and y(α) = FK (L). Here α ∈ Zp is a secret value randomly chosen by the client, and FK(·) is a pseudorandom function that is used to "randomize" a label L. One can think of a label as arbitrary information (e.g., a string) chosen by the client to describe the meaning of the authenticated value m (e.g., "air pollution on 2013/08/14 at 9:06:12"). Given a set of n authentication polynomials y1, . . . , yn, the server creates a new MAC y which authenticates (i.e., it proves) that m is the result of f (m1, . . . , mn), e.g., f could be the variance of pollution levels at all time instants within a specific day/year etc. More specifically, the basic idea in [15] is to compute y by homomorphically executing the function f on the corresponding authentication polynomials, i.e., y = f (y1, . . . , yn). By the design of the yi, this computation satisfies y(0) = f (m1, . . . , mn) and also y(α) = f (FK (L1), . . . , FK (Ln)). Hence, the client can test whether a value m ′ (proposed by the server) is indeed the result of a computation f (m1, . . . , mn) by checking whether the MAC y provided by the server verifies the two conditions:
. . , FK (Ln)). However, the Catalano-Fiore homomorphic MAC cannot be adopted in our setting: verifying a MAC for a function f requires the client to compute W = f (FK (L1), . . . , FK (Ln)) to perform check (ii), but this clearly takes the same time T as that for computing f -exactly what we want to avoid! One may then hope that once this value W is computed, it could be re-used, e.g., to verify other computations involving f . Unfortunately, this would require the re-use of labels, which is not possible at all: it is forbidden by the security definition used in [15] . More critically, the security of the Catalano-Fiore MAC completely breaks down in the presence of label re-use! In our work, we solve this critical issue with two main ideas. Very informally, we first elaborate a model that allows us to partially, but safely, re-use labels. Then, we introduce the construction of a pseudorandom function which allows us to precompute a piece of label-independent information ω f , such that ω f can be re-used to compute W very efficiently (when the labels Li are known).
To allow for a meaningful re-use of labels, we split labels in two dimensions, thus elaborating a model of multi-labels. A multi-label L consists of two components (∆, τ ) where ∆ is the data set identifier and τ is the input identifier. A data set identifier could for instance be "air pollution on 2013/08/14"; and an input identifier could be used to identify a time, e.g., 9:06:12 am. For the example of the stock market data, the values could be the stock market prices for a company C at different times T . Then, the data set identifier could be the name of C while the input identifier could be the date and time T of the stock market price. The data set identifier is essentially a way of grouping together homogeneous data (e.g., data of the same population over which one wants to compute significant statistics) in such a way that one can compute within a data set ∆.
While a multi-label L = (∆, τ ) can still not be re-used to authenticate different messages, this model does allow us to assign the same input identifiers τ to as many messages as we need, as long as such messages lie in different data sets. In any case, a re-use of a complete multi-label for authentication purposes would not make much sense, as multi-labels are used by clients to "remember" and categorize the outsourced data. This transition from labels to multi-labels is natural: think again of the air pollution levels for a specific day. The input identifiers capture the hours of a day. Hence, the input identifiers might be re-used for other days, but the combination of date and time would never be re-used.
The use of multi-labels, however, does not in itself solve the issue of the inefficient verification algorithm: in this case one still has to compute W = f (FK (∆, τ1), . . . , FK(∆, τn)). Our key technical tool for achieving efficient verification is the introduction of a pseudorandom function F with a new property that we call amortized closed-form efficiency: if one precomputes some information ω f related to a program f with input identifiers τ1, . . . , τn, but independent of the data set ∆, then it is possible to use ω f to compute W , for any data set ∆, very efficiently, e.g., in constant time. Amortized closed-form efficiency essentially extends the closedform efficiency of Benabbas et al. [9] to the setting in which the same function f is evaluated on many pseudorandom inputs.
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If we consider the example mentioned before, then one can precompute the verification information ω f for the function "variance of the air pollution levels at all time instants within a day" (without knowing the actual data), and then use such ω f for verifying the computation of this statistic on any specific day (i.e., the data set) in constant time.
We propose an efficient instantiation of amortized closedform efficient PRFs whose security is based on standard PRFs and on the Decision Linear assumption [11] , thereby achieving amortized closed-form efficiency in constant time, i.e., independent of the input size n. Our PRF maps pairs of binary strings (∆, τ ) to pseudorandom values in a group G of prime order p. For this technical reason, we changed the Catalano-Fiore MAC (which works with a PRF mapping to Zp) so as to encode the MACs y into elements of G, and we used pairings to "simulate" the ring behavior over Zp for all those computations that require at most one multiplication, i.e., arithmetic circuits of degree bounded by 2.
Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review notation and basic definitions. In Section 3 we introduce the notions of multi-labeled programs and the definition of homomorphic message authenticators with efficient verification for multi-labeled programs. Next, Section 4 contains the description of two technical tools that will be important for the design of our new construction of homomorphic MACs: algorithms for the homomorphic evaluation of arithmetic circuits, and pseudorandom functions with amortized closed-form efficiency. Finally, in Section 5, we give our construction of homomorphic MACs with efficient verification, we discuss its efficiency, and we prove its security.
Due to space constraints, some detailed descriptions and proofs appear in an extended version of this work [7] .
PRELIMINARIES
We will denote with λ ∈ N a security parameter. We say that a function ǫ is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. If S is a set, x ←R S denotes the process of selecting x uniformly at random in S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, x ←R A(·) denotes the process of running A on some input and assigning its output to x. Algebraic Tools. Let G(1 λ ) be an algorithm that on input the security parameter 1 λ , outputs the description of bilinear groups bgpp = (p, G, GT , e, g) where G and GT are groups of the same prime order p > 2 λ , g ∈ G is a generator and e : G × G → GT is an efficiently computable bilinear map. We call such an algorithm G a bilinear group generator.
Arithmetic Circuits. Informally, an arithmetic circuit takes input variables X = {τ1 . . . τn} over a field F on its incoming wires, and computes over these inputs using addition and multiplication gates. For lack of space, we refer the interested reader to [48] for a useful survey on this subject. Here we only review some definitions useful for our work. Arithmetic circuits evaluate polynomials in the following way. Addition (resp. multiplication) gates compute the polynomial obtained by the sum (resp. product) of the two polynomials on their incoming wires. The output of the circuit is the value returned by its last gate. The degree of a gate is defined as the total degree of the polynomial computed by that gate. The degree deg(f ) of a circuit f is the maximal degree of all its gates. In this paper, we restrict our interest to families of circuits {f λ } over F with deg(f λ ) ≤ 2.
HOMOMORPHIC MACS WITH EFFICIENT VERIFICATION
Homomorphic message authenticators were first defined by Gennaro and Wichs [27] . Their definition was tailored to the model of labeled programs defined therein. Roughly speaking, a labeled program is a function f (e.g., a circuit) which takes in n variable inputs such that each of these variables is assigned a label τ (e.g., a binary string). One may think of such labeling of variables as a way to give useful names to the variables of a program. Using this model, homomorphic message authenticators were defined in [27] in such a way that a message m is authenticated with respect to a label τ . Binding m with τ essentially means that the value m can be assigned to those input variables of a labeled program f whose label is τ . This, however, imposes a limitation: a label cannot be re-used for multiple messages, i.e., one cannot authenticate two different messages m, m ′ with respect to the same label τ . This limitation makes perfect sense if one considers labeling of the data as a way to uniquely "categorize" the data, which is useful, for instance, in cases where a user outsources her data to a remote server and does not keep a local copy of the data. However, for the purpose of labeling programs, the re-use limitation also requires changing the labeling of the variable inputs of f whenever f is executed on a different set of inputs.
In other words, labels are useful to identify both concrete data items and variable inputs of programs. The current definition of homomorphic MACs, however, focuses more on a labeling mechanism for data items, instead of capturing the notion of identifying the program inputs. In the next section, we bridge this gap by introducing so-called multilabels that aim to capture both useful properties of labels: program variable labeling and data labeling. Thereafter, we give a definition of homomorphic MACs for multi-labeled programs.
Multi-Labeled Programs
We elaborate a variation of labeled programs that we call multi-labeled programs. The basic idea behind our model is to introduce the notion of a multi-label L, which consists of two parts: a data set identifier ∆ and an input identifier τ . Input identifiers, in isolation, are used to label the variable inputs of a function f , whereas the combination of both, i.e., the full multi-label L = (∆, τ ), is used to uniquely identify a specific data item. Precisely, binding a value m with multilabel (∆, τ ) means that m can be assigned to those input variables with input identifier τ . The pair (∆, τ ) is necessary to uniquely identify m. While one can still not re-use a pair (∆, τ ) for authentication purposes, one can re-use the input identifier τ , instead.
For the sake of illustration, consider the multi-labeled approach as a separation of data items into two independent dimensions. One might think of a database table, e.g., storing air pollution levels, where some function f : M n → M is evaluated over n columns (labeled τ1, . . . , τn). Each such column could represent a point in time, e.g., 7:05, 07:10, etc. This computation is performed for each row (labeled ∆i) of the table. Each such row could represent a different day, e.g., 2013/08/14, 2013/08/15, etc. We hence evaluate f∆ i (τ1, . . . , τn) for each row i, hence for each day.
Labeled Programs. First, we review the notion of labeled programs introduced by Gennaro and Wichs [27] . While this notion was given for the case of Boolean circuits f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, here we generalize it to the case of any function f defined over an appropriate set M. A labeled program P is defined by a tuple (f, τ1, . . . , τn) where f : M n → M is a function on n variables, and each τi ∈ {0, 1} * is the label of the i-th variable input of f . Labeled programs allow for composition as follows. Given labeled programs P1, . . . , Pt and given a function g : M t → M, the composed program P * corresponds to evaluating g on the outputs of P1, . . . , Pt. The composed program is compactly denoted as P * = g(P1, . . . , Pt). The labeled inputs of P * are all distinct labeled inputs of P1, . . . , Pt, i.e., all inputs with the same label are grouped together in a single input of the new program. If f id : M → M is the canonical identity function and τ ∈ {0, 1} * is a label, then Iτ = (f id , τ ) denotes the identity program for input label τ . Notice that any program P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn) can be expressed as the composition of n identity programs P = f (Iτ 1 , . . . , Iτ n ). Multi-labeled Programs. Intuitively, multi-labeled programs are an extension of labeled programs in which a labeled program P is augmented with a data set identifier ∆. Formally, we define a multi-labeled program P∆ as a pair (P, ∆) where P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn) is a labeled program (as defined above) and ∆ ∈ {0, 1} * is a binary string called the data set identifier. Multi-labeled programs allow for composition within the same data set in the most natural way, i.e., given multi-labeled programs (P1, ∆), . . . , (Pt, ∆) having the same data set identifier ∆, and given a function g : M t → M, the composed multi-labeled program P * ∆ is the pair (P * , ∆) where P * is the composed program g(P1, . . . , Pt), and ∆ is the data set identifier shared by all the Pi. If f id : M → M is the canonical identity function and L = (∆, τ ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) 2 is a multi-label, then I L = (f id , L) denotes the identity multi-labeled program for data set ∆ and input label τ . As for labeled programs, any multi-labeled program P∆ = ((f, τ1, . . . , τn), ∆) can also be expressed as the composition of n identity multi-labeled programs: P∆ = f (I L 1 , . . . , I Ln ) where Li = (∆, τi).
It is worth noting that, in the notation of [27] , a multilabeled program P∆ = ((f, τ1, . . . , τn), ∆) is essentially a labeled program (f, L1, . . . , Ln) where each string Li is a multi-label (∆, τi). The main difference here is the (explicit) notion of labeled data sets that we use in order to group together several inputs, similarly to the definition used for homomorphic signatures [13, 23] . This explicit splitting will turn out to be crucial in order to achieve the desired property of efficient verification.
Hom. MACs for Multi-Labeled Programs
We review the notion of homomorphic message authenticators [27, 15] . We have adapted the definition to our model of multi-labeled programs as defined in the previous section.
Definition 1.
A homomorphic message authenticator scheme HomMAC-ML for multi-label programs is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen, Auth, Ver, Eval) satisfying four properties: authentication correctness, evaluation correctness, succinctness, and security. More precisely:
given the security parameter λ, the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key sk and a public evaluation key ek. Auth(sk, L, m): given the secret key sk, a multi-label L = (∆, τ ) and a message m ∈ M, it outputs a tag σ.
Ver(sk, P∆, m, σ): given the secret key sk, a multi-labeled program P∆ = ((f, τ1, . . . , τn), ∆), a message m ∈ M, and a tag σ, the verification algorithm outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). Eval(ek, f, σ): on input the evaluation key ek, a circuit f : M n → M and a vector of tags σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), the evaluation algorithm outputs a new tag σ.
Authentication Correctness. Informally speaking, a homomorphic MAC has authentication correctness if any tag σ generated by the algorithm Auth(sk, L, m) authenticates m with respect to the identity program I L . More formally, we say that a scheme HomMAC-ML satisfies authentication correctness if for any message m ∈ M, all keys (sk, ek) ←R KeyGen(1 λ ), any multi-label L = (∆, τ ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) 2 , and any tag σ ←R Auth(sk, L, m), we have that Ver(sk, I L , m, σ) = 1 holds with probability 1. Evaluation Correctness. This property aims at capturing that if the evaluation algorithm is run on a vector of tags σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) such that each σi authenticates some message mi as the output of a multi-labeled program (Pi, ∆), then the tag σ produced by Eval must authenticate f (m1, . . . , mn) as the output of the composed program (f (P1, . . . , Pn), ∆). More formally, let us fix a pair of keys (sk, ek) ←R KeyGen(1 λ ), a function g : M t → M and any set of message/program/tag triples {(mi, P∆,i, σi)} t i=1 such that all multi-labeled programs P∆,i = (Pi, ∆) (i.e., share the same data set identifier ∆) and Ver(sk, P∆,i, mi, σi) = 1. If m * = g(m1, . . . , mt), P * = g(P1, . . . , Pt), and σ * = Eval(ek, g, (σ1, . . . , σt)), then Ver(sk, P * ∆ , m * , σ * ) = 1 holds with probability 1.
Succinctness. The size of a tag is bounded by some fixed polynomial in the security parameter, which is independent of the number n of inputs taken by the evaluated circuit.
Security.
A homomorphic MAC has to satisfy the following notion of unforgeability. Let HomMAC-ML be a homomorphic MAC scheme as defined above and let A be an adversary. HomMAC-ML is said to be unforgeable if for every PPT adv. A, we have Pr[HomUF−CMA A,HomMAC-ML (λ) = 1] ≤ ǫ(λ) where ǫ(λ) is a negligible function. The experiment HomUF−CMA A,HomMAC-ML (λ) is the one defined below.
Setup The challenger generates (sk, ek) ←R KeyGen(1 λ ) and gives ek to A.
Authentication queries The adversary can adaptively ask
for tags on multi-labels and messages of its choice. Given a query (L, m) where L = (∆, τ ), the challenger proceeds as follows: If (L, m) is the first query with data set identifier ∆, then the challenger initializes an empty list T∆ = ∅ for data set identifier ∆. If T∆ does not contain a tuple (τ, ·) (i.e., the multi-label (∆, τ ) was never queried), the challenger computes σ ←R Auth(sk, L, m), returns σ to A and updates the list T∆←T∆ ∪ (τ, m). If (τ, m) ∈ T∆ (i.e., the query was previously made), then the challenger replies with the same tag generated before. If T∆ contains a tuple (τ, m ′ ) for some message m ′ = m, then the challenger ignores the query.
Verification queries
The adversary has access to a verification oracle as follows: Given a query (P∆, m, σ) from A, the challenger replies with the output of Ver(sk, P∆, m, σ).
Forgery The adversary terminates the experiment by returning a forgery (P * ∆ * , m * , σ * ) for some P * ∆ * = (P * , ∆ * ) and P * = (f * , τ * 1 , . . . , τ * n ). Notice that, equivalently, A can implicitly return such a tuple as a verification query (P * ∆ * , m * , σ * ) during the experiment.
Before describing the outcome of this experiment, we review the notion of well-defined programs with respect to a list T∆ [15] . A labeled program P * = (f * , τ * 1 , . . . , τ * n ) is welldefined with respect to T∆ * if either one of the following two cases holds:
• there exist messages m1, . . . , mn such that the list T∆ * contains all tuples (τ * 1 , m1), . . . , (τ * n , mn). Intuitively, this means that the entire input space of f for data set ∆ * has been authenticated.
• there exist indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (τ * i , ·) / ∈ T∆ * (i.e., A never asked authentication queries with multilabel (∆ * , τ * i )), and the function f
∈T ∆ * ) outputs the same value for all possible choices ofmj ∈ M. Intuitively, this case means that the unauthenticated inputs never contribute to the computation of f .
To define the output of the experiment HomUF−CMA, we say it outputs 1 if and only if Ver(sk, P * ∆ * , m * , σ * ) = 1 and one of the following conditions holds:
• Type 1 Forgery: no list T∆ * was created during the game, i.e., no message m has been authenticated with respect to a data set identifier ∆ * during the experiment.
• Type 2 Forgery: P * is well-defined w.r.t. T∆ * and m * = f * ({mj } (τ j ,m j )∈T ∆ * ), i.e., m * is not the correct output of the labeled program P * when executed on previously authenticated messages (m1, . . . , mn).
• Type 3 Forgery: P * is not well-defined w.r.t. T∆ * .
Our definition is obtained by extending the one by Catalano and Fiore [15] to our model of multi-labeled programs. The resulting definition is very close to the one proposed by Freeman for homomorphic signatures [23] , with the exception that we allow for arbitrary labels, and we do not impose any a-priori fixed bound on the number of elements in a data set.
In the most general case where f can be any function, it might not be possible to efficiently (i.e., in polynomial time) check whether a program P is well-defined w.r.t. a list T . However, for more specific classes of computations, this is not an issue. For example, Freeman showed that this is not a problem for linear functions [23] . In the following proposition (whose proof appears in the full version), we show a similar result for the classes of computations considered in our work, i.e., arithmetic circuits defined over the finite field Zp where p is a prime of roughly λ bits, and whose degree d is bounded by a polynomial. In particular, we show that any adversary who wins by producing a Type 3 forgery can be converted into one who outputs a Type 2 forgery. Proposition 1. Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter, let p > 2 λ be a prime number, and let {f λ } be a family of arithmetic circuits over Zp whose degree is bounded by some poly- 
Homomorphic MACs with Efficient Verification for Multi-Labeled Programs
In this section we introduce a new property for homomorphic MACs that we call efficient verification. Informally, a homomorphic MAC satisfies efficient verification if it is possible to verify a tag σ against a multi-labeled program P∆ = (P, ∆) in less time than that required to compute P. We define this efficiency property in an amortized sense, so that the verification is more efficient when the same program P is executed on different data sets. The formal definition follows.
Definition 2. Let HomMAC-ML = (KeyGen, Auth, Ver, Eval) be a homomorphic MAC scheme for multi-labeled programs as defined in the previous section. HomMAC-ML satisfies efficient verification if there exist two additional algorithms (VerPrep, EffVer) as follows:
VerPrep(sk, P): on input the secret key sk and a labeled program P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn), this algorithm generates a concise verification key VKP . We stress that this verification key does not depend on any data set identifier ∆.
EffVer(sk, VKP , ∆, m, σ): given the secret key sk, a verification key VKP , a data set identifier ∆, a message m ∈ M and a tag σ, the efficient verification algorithm outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
The above algorithms are required to satisfy the following two properties:
Correctness. Let (sk, ek) ←R KeyGen(1 λ ) be honestly generated keys, and (P∆, m, σ) be any program/message/tag tuple with P∆ = (P, ∆) such that Ver(sk, P∆, m, σ) = 1. Then, for every VKP ←R VerPrep(sk, P), we have Pr[EffVer(sk, VKP , ∆, m, σ) = 1] = 1.
Amortized Efficiency. Let P∆ = (P, ∆) be a program, let (m1, . . . , mn) ∈ M n be any vector of inputs, and let t(n) be the time required to compute P(m1, . . . , mn). If VKP ←VerPrep(sk, P), then the time required for EffVer(sk, VKP , ∆, m, σ) is O(1), i.e., independent of n.
Notice that in our efficiency requirement, we do not include the time needed to compute VKP . The reason is, since VKP is independent of ∆, the same VKP can be re-used in many verifications involving the same labeled program P but many different ∆. In this sense, the cost of computing VKP is amortized over many verifications of the same function on different data sets.
Application to Verifiable Computation on Outsourced Data. A homomorphic MAC scheme with efficient verification can be easily used to obtain a protocol for verifiable delegation of computations on outsourced data, satisfying the requirements (1)-(5) mentioned in Section 1. Below, we sketch such a protocol between a client C and a server S:
Setup: C generates the keys (sk, ek) ←R KeyGen(1 λ ) for a homomorphic MAC, sends ek to S and stores sk.
Data Outsourcing: to outsource a value m, C first authenticates m wrt. some multi-label L, i.e., σ ←R Auth(sk, L, m), and then sends (m, L, σ) to the server. It is easy to see that this phase satisfies the requirements of unbounded storage (4) and function independence (5).
Client's Preparation: assume that C needs to evaluate a labeled program P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn) on some of its outsourced data sets. In this preparation phase (offline), the client computes and stores VKP ←R VerPrep(sk, P) (independently of any ∆).
Delegation: when the client wants to compute P on a data set ∆ (online), it simply sends (P, ∆) to the server.
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Computation: to compute (P, ∆), where P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn), the server first looks for the corresponding data (m1, . . . , mn) and tags (σ1, . . . , σn) according to the labeling previously sent by C. Next, S computes m = f (m1, . . . , mn) and σ←Eval(ek, f, σ1, . . . , σn), and sends (m, σ) to C.
Verification: given the result (m, σ) sent by S, the client checks that m is the correct output of the multi-labeled program (P, ∆) by running EffVer(sk, VKP , ∆, m, σ). By the amortized efficiency property of the homomorphic MAC, we obtain that C achieves amortized input-independent efficiency (3) -and thus also efficiency (2) -in verifying the delegated computations.
Finally, from the unforgeability of the homomorphic MAC, it is straightforward to see that the server cannot induce the client to accept incorrect results (1).
UTILITIES
This section provides some technical tools that will be useful to obtain our construction of homomorphic MACs with efficient verification.
Hom. Evaluation of Arithmetic Circuits
In the next two sections, we describe algorithms for the homomorphic evaluation of an arithmetic circuit f : M n → M over values defined in some appropriate set J = M.
Homomorphic Evaluation over Polynomials. As a first example, we consider the case in which J is a ring of polynomials. More formally, let J poly = Zp[x1, . . . , xm] be the ring of polynomials in variables x1, . . . , xm over Zp. For every fixed tuple a = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Z m p , let φ a : J poly → Zp be the function defined by φ a (y) = y(a1, . . . , am) for any y ∈ J poly . By the substitution property of polynomials, φ a is a homomorphism from J poly = Zp[x1, . . . , xm] to Zp, i.e., ∀y1, y2 ∈ J poly it holds: φ a (y1 + y2) = φ a (y1) + φ a (y2) and φ a (y1 · y2) = φ a (y1) · φ a (y2). By simple induction, we then observe that for a given arithmetic circuit f : Z n p → Zp, there exists another circuitf : J n poly → J poly such that ∀y1, . . . , yn ∈ J poly : φ a (f (y1, . . . , yn)) = f (φ a (y1), . . . , φ a (yn)). The circuitf is basically the same as f , except that operations in Zp are replaced by the corresponding operations in Zp[x1, . . . , xm]. We formally write the computation off as the algorithm PolyEval(m, f, y1, . . . , yn), for which the following property holds: for any homomorphism φ a defined by a = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Z m p , and for any circuit f and any values y1, . . . , yn ∈ J poly : φ a (PolyEval(m, f, y1, . . . , yn)) = f (φ a (y1), . . . , φ a (yn))
We remark that in our work we will use PolyEval only for f of degree 2, and with m = 1 and m = 2.
Homomorphic Evaluation over Bilinear Groups. As a second example, we show how to homomorphically evaluate arithmetic circuits, of degree at most 2, over prime order groups with bilinear maps. Let bgpp = (p, G, GT , e, g) be the description of bilinear groups where G has prime order p. If we fix a generator g ∈ G, then G and the additive group (Zp, +) are isomorphic by considering the isomorphism φg(x) = g x for every x ∈ Zp. Similarly, by the property of the pairing function e, we also have that GT and the additive group (Zp, +) are isomorphic by considering φg T (x) = e(g, g)
x . Since φg and φg T are isomorphisms there also exist the corresponding inverses φ
For every arithmetic circuit f : Z n p → Zp of degree at most 2, we define GroupEval(f, X1, . . . , Xn) to be the algorithm which homomorphically evaluates f with inputs in G and output in GT in such a way that, for every tuple (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ G n , and every such circuit f , we have that
holds, where
, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. Given a circuit f of degree at most 2, and given an n-tuple of values (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ G n , GroupEval intuitively proceeds as follows. It computes additions by using the group operation in G or in GT . To compute multiplications, it uses the pairing function, e.g., R = e(R1, R2), thus "lifting" the result to the group GT . By our assumption on the degree of f , one can see that multiplication is well defined. A more formal description of GroupEval and a proof that it satisfies Equation (1) are given in the full version.
Pseudorandom Functions with Amortized
Closed-Form Efficiency
Here we introduce one of most important technical tools for our construction, that is the notion of pseudorandom functions with amortized closed-form efficiency. This primitive is an extension of closed-form efficient PRFs proposed by Benabbas et al. [9] , and later refined by Fiore and Gennaro [22] . As we will show in Section 5, this new notion of PRFs will be crucial for achieving the property of efficient verification in our homomorphic MAC realization. In a nutshell, closed-form efficient PRFs [9] are defined like standard PRFs with the additional requirement of satisfying the following efficiency property. Assume there exists a computation Comp(R1, . . . , Rn, z) which takes random inputs R1, . . . , Rn and arbitrary inputs z, and runs in time t(n, | z|). Also, think of the case in which each Ri is generated as FK (Li). Then the PRF F is said to satisfy closedform efficiency for (Comp, L) if, by knowing the seed K, one can compute Comp (FK(L1) , . . . , FK (Ln), z) in time strictly less than t. Here, the key observation is that in the pseudorandom case all the Ri values have a shorter "closed-form" representation (as function of K), and this might also allow for a shorter closed-form representation of the computation.
Starting from the above considerations, we introduce a new property for PRFs that we call amortized closed-form efficiency. Our basic idea is to address computations Comp(R1, . . . , Rn, z) of the above form, but then consider the case in which all values Ri are generated as FK (∆, τi). Basically, we interpret the PRF inputs Li as pairs of values (∆, τi), all sharing the same ∆ component. Then, we informally say that F satisfies amortized closed-form efficiency if it is possible to compute ℓ computations {Comp (FK(∆j , τ1) , . . . , FK (∆j, τn), z)} ℓ j=1 in time strictly less than ℓ · t. More detailed definitions follow.
A PRF consists of two algorithms (KG, F) such that (1) the key generation KG takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and outputs a secret key K and some public parameters pp that specify domain X and range R of the function, and (2) the function FK (x) takes input x ∈ X and uses the secret key K to compute a value R ∈ R. As usual, a PRF must satisfy the pseudorandomness property. Namely, we say that (KG, F) is secure if for every PPT adversary A we have that:
where ǫ(λ) is negligible, (K, pp) ←R KG(1 λ ), and Φ : X → R is a random function.
For any PRF (KG, F) we define amortized closed-form efficiency as follows. , τ1) , . . . , FK (∆, τn), z) for many different ∆. Second, the efficiency property puts a restriction only on the running time of CFEval on . This is related to the previous remark, and it captures the idea of achieving efficiency in an amortized sense when considering many evaluations of Comp (FK (∆, τ1) , . . . , FK(∆, τn), z), each with a different data set identifier ∆. More concretely, this means that one can precompute ω once, and then use it to run CFEval on as many times as he needs, almost for free. It is worth noting that the structure of Comp may enforce some constraints on the range R of the PRF, and that due to the pseudorandomness property, the output distribution of CFEval 
A PRF with Amortized Closed-Form Efficiency for GroupEval
We propose an efficient construction of a pseudorandom function which satisfies amortized closed-form efficiency for the algorithm GroupEval, given in Section 4.1. Our PRF construction uses two generic pseudorandom functions which map binary strings to integers in Zp (where p is a sufficiently large prime number), together with a weak PRF whose security relies on the Decision Linear assumption, first introduced by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [11] .
Our pseudorandom function. Here we describe our PRF with amortized closed-form efficiency:
) be a bilinear group description. The key generation chooses two seeds K1, K2 for a family of PRFs F
Finally, it outputs K = (bgpp, K1, K2) and pp = bgpp. The parameters define a function F with domain X = {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * and range G, as described below.
FK (x). Let x = (∆, τ ) ∈ X be the input value. To compute the corresponding output R ∈ G, the algorithm generates values (u, v)←F
, and then outputs R = g ua+vb .
We first show that the above function is pseudorandom, and then we will show that it admits amortized closed-form efficiency for GroupEval.
′ is a pseudorandom function and the Decision Linear assumption holds for G, then the function (KG, F) described above is a pseudorandom function.
For lack of space, the proof of Theorem 1 appears only in the full version of this work. Here we notice that the pseudorandomness essentially follows from the security of the PRF F ′ , and the fact that
is a weak pseudorandom function under the Decision Linear assumption. To prove the weak pseudorandomness of f a,b (·, ·) we use the random self-reducibility property of the Decision Linear problem, shown in Lemma 7 in [34] .
Amortized Closed-Form Efficiency. Here we show that the pseudorandom function described before satisfies amortized closed-form efficiency for (GroupEval, L).
CFEval off GroupEval,τ (K, f ). Let K = (bgpp, K1, K2) be a secret key as generated by KG(1 λ ). For i = 1 to n, compute (ui, vi)←F ′ K 1 (τi), and set ρi = (0, ui, vi): ρi are essentially the coefficients of a degree-1 polynomial ρi(z1, z2) in two (unknown) variables z1, z2.
Next, run ρ←PolyEval(2, f, ρ1, . . . , ρn) to compute the coefficients ρ of a polynomial ρ(z1, z2) such that ∀z1, z2 ∈ Zp it holds ρ(z1, z2) = f (ρ1(z1, z2) , . . . , ρn(z1, z2)).
Finally, output ω f = ρ.
CFEval on GroupEval,∆ (K, ω f ). Let K = (bgpp, K1, K2) be a secret key and let ω f = ρ be as computed by the previous algorithm. The online evaluation algorithm first generates (a, b)←F ′ K 2 (∆), and then it uses the coefficients ρ to compute w = ρ(a, b), and it finally outputs W = e(g, g)
w .
We observe that the complexity of the online algorithm depends on the size of ρ, hence on the number of coefficients of a two-variate polynomial whose degree is the same as the degree of f . In general, for f of degree d, this would be | ρ| = d+2 d
. Considering our specific case of GroupEval which evaluates arithmetic circuits of degree at most 2, and by observing that the degree-0 coefficient is always 0, we obtain a vector ρ which can be represented with 5 elements of Zp. Moreover, we observe the interesting fact that, due to the bound deg(f ) ≤ 2 and due to having only m = 2 variables, the computation of ρ using PolyEval(2, f, ρ1, . . . , ρn) can be done at roughly the same cost of running f .
It is not hard to check that the above algorithms satisfy the properties of correctness and amortized efficiency given in Definition 3. In particular, correctness follows from the the correctness properties of PolyEval and GroupEval. A formal proof of this property appears in the full version.
HOMOMORPHIC MACS WITH EFFICIENT VERIFICATION
In this section, we describe our construction of homomorphic MACs with efficient verification for multi-labeled programs as introduced in Section 3.3. In particular, the following theorem summarizes the main result of this work which is obtained by combining the EVH−MAC construction (see below) and our concrete instantiation of the PRF with amortized closed-form efficiency based on the Decision Linear assumption (Section 4.3).
Theorem 2. If the Decision Linear assumption holds, then EVH−MAC is a secure homomorphic message authenticator which supports evaluations of any arithmetic circuit f of degree at most 2, and achieves efficient verification, i.e., EVH−MAC has amortized efficiency in which the offline verification VerPrep takes time O(|f |), and the online verification EffVer takes time O(1).
Our construction works for circuits whose additive gates do not get inputs labeled by constants. As mentioned in [15] , this can be done without loss of generality as one can use an equivalent circuit with a special variable/label for the constant 1 and publish the MAC of 1. Our scheme EVH−MAC is defined as follows:
to generate the description of bilinear groups. Let bgpp = (p, G, GT , e, g) as defined above. Let the message space M be Zp. Choose a random value α ←R Zp, and run (K, pp) ←R KG(1 λ ) to obtain the seed K of a pseudorandom function FK : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → G. Output the secret key sk = (bgpp, pp, K, α), and the evaluation key ek = (bgpp, pp).
Auth(sk, L, m). To authenticate a message m ∈ Zp with multi-label L = (∆, τ ) where ∆ ∈ {0, 1} λ is the identifier of a data set and τ ∈ {0, 1} λ is an input identifier, proceed as follows. First, compute R←FK(∆, τ ) and then compute values (y0, Y1) ∈ Zp × G by setting: y0 = m and Y1 = (R · g −m ) 1/α . Finally, output the tag σ = (y0, Y1).
If we let y1 ∈ Zp be the (unique) value such that Y1 = g y 1 , then (y0, y1) are basically the coefficients of a degree-1 polynomial y(x) that evaluates to m on the point 0 (i.e., y(0) = m) and it evaluates to r = φ −1 g (R) on a hidden random point α (i.e., y(α) = r).
Eval(ek, f, σ). The homomorphic evaluation algorithm takes as input the evaluation key ek = (bgpp, pp), an arithmetic circuit f : Z n p → Zp, and a vector σ of tags (σ1, . . . , σn). Eval proceeds gate-by-gate as follows. At every gate fg, given two tags σ1, σ2 (or a tag σ1 and a constant c ∈ Zp), it runs the algorithm σ←GateEval(ek, fg, σ1, σ2) described below that returns a new tag σ, which is in turn passed on as input to the next gate in the circuit. When the computation reaches the last gate of the circuit f , Eval outputs the tag vector σ obtained by running GateEval on such last gate. To complete the description of Eval we thus describe the subroutine GateEval:
2 ) ∈ Zp × G × GT for i = 1, 2 (see below for the special case when one of the two inputs is a constant c ∈ Zp). For ease of description, wheneverŶ
is not defined, we assumeŶ
The goal is to compute (y0, Y1,Ŷ2) as follows. For an addition with gate f+, compute y0 = y0
(
2 . For a multiplication with gate f× compute y0 = y0
(1) · y0 (2) ,
1 ). Because of our assumption that deg (f ) ≤ 2, we can assume that σ (i) = (y
1 ) ∈ Zp × G for both i = 1, 2. For a multiplication with a constant, where one of the two inputs, say σ2, is a constant c ∈ Zp, compute y0 = c · y0 (1) ,
2 ) c . Return σ = (y0, Y1,Ŷ2).
Ver(sk, P∆, m, σ). Let sk = (bgpp, pp, K, α) be a secret key. Let P∆ = (P, ∆) be a multi-labeled program for P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn) and data set ∆. Let m ∈ Zp be the result to be verified, and let σ = (y0, Y1,Ŷ2) be a tag. The verification proceeds as follows. For i = 1 to n, compute Ri←FK (∆, τi). Then run W ←GroupEval(f, R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ GT , as described in Section 4.1. Finally, check the following equations:
If both checks are satisfied, then output 1, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, to complete the description of EVH−MAC we give the algorithms for efficient verification:
VerPrep(sk, P). Let P = (f, τ ) be a labeled program where f ∈ Z n p → Zp is an arithmetic circuit and τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) is a vector of input identifiers for f . The algorithm computes concise verification information VKP = ω where ω is obtained by using the offline closed-form efficient algorithm of F for GroupEval, i.e., ω←CFEval off GroupEval,τ (K, f ). EffVer(sk, VKP , ∆, m, σ). Let sk = (bgpp, pp, K, α) be a secret key. Let VKP = ω be the concise verification information for P. Let m ∈ Zp be the result to be verified and let σ = (y0, Y1,Ŷ2) be a tag. The online verification proceeds as follows. First, it runs the online closed-form efficient algorithm of F for GroupEval, in order to compute W ←CFEval on GroupEval,∆ (K, ω). Finally, it runs the same checks (2) and (3) as in standard verification. If both checks are satisfied, then output 1. Otherwise output 0.
Efficiency Analysis. We discuss the concrete efficiency of our scheme when implemented with specific security parameters of 80 and 128 bits. In particular, we consider the bandwidth costs for sending the MACs over the network, and the computational timings of the various algorithms at both the client and the server. The timings are obtained by evaluating the most significant operations performed by our algorithms, namely modular exponentiations and pairing computations. For our evaluation, we consider an implementation of Type-A (symmetric) pairings using the PBC library [35] , on an 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 workstation running Mac OS X 10.8.3. The timings of all basic operations needed by our scheme are summarized in Table 1 . In addition, we note that by using 80 (resp. 128) bits of security, an element of Zp can be represented with 160 (resp. 256) bits, an element of G with 512 (resp. 1536) bits, and an element of GT with 1024 (resp. 3072) bits. Most clients' costs are Table 2 : Clients' costs to outsource and to verify.
summarized in Table 2 . Below we illustrate how they are obtained, and we give more details on the remaining costs.
To obtain the bandwidth costs, we observe that the MAC σ created by the client, i.e., as generated by Auth, consists of two elements (y0, Y1) ∈ Zp × G, whereas the MAC returned by Eval may include the additional elementŶ2 ∈ GT .
Next, let us consider the computational performances of the algorithms of EVH−MAC. To authenticate a data item, the client runs Auth, whose cost basically boils down to that of computing Y1. The latter requires one PRF evaluation to generate R (which amounts to one exponentiation in G), plus two other exponentiations, one for m, and one for α −1 . However, with a more careful look at our PRF construction, we observe that this operation can be optimized by computing directly Y1 = g (ua+vb−m)/α , a single exponentiation in G (with precomputation on the fixed basis g). For verification, the client has to first prepare the re-usable verification information VKP using VerPrep. The cost of this algorithm depends on the computation of ω←CFEval off GroupEval,τ (K, f ), which is essentially the same as computing the function f (no exponentiations, pairings or group operations are needed). Such value VKP is stored by the client (its size amounts to at most 5 elements of Zp), and it can be re-used over and over when running P on different data sets, thus amortizing the cost of its computation. To verify a MAC using EffVer in the online phase, the client needs to compute only one pairing (with precomputation on the fixed g), i.e., e(Y1, g), and one multi-exponentiation with three bases 4 , for e(g, g) y 0 −w e(Y1, g) α (Ŷ2) α 2 . To conclude our analysis, we consider the cost required to the server for generating the correctness proofs, i.e., to run Eval. As one can notice, Eval evaluates the circuit f with an additional, constant, overhead which derives from replacing every addition of f with the group operation (in either G or GT ), and every multiplication with one multi-exponentiation in G plus one pairing.
Correctness and Security. For lack of space, we formally prove correctness and security properties of our construction 4 Here we observed that the explicit computation of W = e(g, g) w in CFEval on can be avoided by directly considering e(g, g)
y 0 −w .
only in the full version of this work. Below we provide the reader with some intuitive ideas. Roughly speaking, correctness is based on the following facts: (i) our MACs "encode" polynomials y(x) satisfying y(0) = m and y(α) = r (∆,τ ) ; (ii) by the property of GroupEval, the verification can recompute w = f (r (∆,τ 1 ) , . . . , r (∆,τn) ) "in the exponent"; (iii) Eval essentially evaluates PolyEval "in the exponent", thus preserving the property on y(α), i.e., y(α) = w. Correctness of EffVer instead follows from the correctness of the amortized closed-form efficiency for GroupEval (see Section 4.3).
The security of EVH−MAC is shown via the following theorem whose proof is contained in the long version [7] .
Theorem 3. Let λ be the security parameter, F be a pseudorandom function with security ǫ F , and G be a bilinear group generator. Then, any PPT adversary A making Q verification queries has probability at most ǫ = 2·ǫ F + of breaking the security of EVH−MAC.
